PIO
C. GRANDE, RUFINO C. G.R.
No. 148456
GRANDE, AIDA C. GRANDE,
FLORENCIA GRANDE-
TERESITA GRANDE-VIOLA,
JOSEPHINE GRANDE DOMINGO QUISUMBING,
J.,
(representing the heirs of Crisanta Chairperson,
Grande-Domingo),
and ESTANISLAO CARPIO,
QUIBAL
(representing the heirs CARPIO MORALES,
of
Rosita Grande-Quibal),*
TINGA, and
Petitioners, VELASCO, JR., JJ.
- versus
-
Promulgated:
UNIVERSITY OF THE
Respondent.
x-------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Tinga,
J.:
This treats of the “Petition for
Annulment of Judgment” that seeks the annulment of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA- G.R. CV No. 44411 promulgated on
The Court of Appeals in its Decision[1]
dismissed the appeal interposed by petitioners from the decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Petitioners, through their former
counsel, received a copy of the Court of Appeals’ Decision on
It was only on 29 June 2001, more than a year after the appellate court’s rulings had become final, that petitioners filed with this Court the present “Petition for Annulment of Judgment,” seeking the nullification of the rulings. Respondent points out that the procedure undertaken by petitioners finds no sanction under the Rules of Court.
We agree, and add more. Accordingly, we dismiss the petition.
The annulment of judgments, as a recourse, is equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases, as where there is no available or other adequate remedy.[5] It is generally governed by Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 1 thereof expressly states that the Rule “shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil action of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.”[6] Clearly, Rule 47 applies only to petitions for the nullification of judgments rendered by regional trial courts filed with the Court of Appeals. It does not pertain to the nullification of decisions of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners argue that although Rule 47 is a newly-established rule, the procedure of annulment of judgments has long been recognized in this jurisdiction. That may be so, but this Court has no authority to take cognizance of an original action for annulment of judgment of any lower court. The only original cases cognizable before this Court are “petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, disciplinary proceedings against members of the judiciary and attorneys, and cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls.”[7] Petitions for annulment of judgment are not among the cases originally cognizable by this Court.
Moreover, if what is desired is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals, which petitioners could have been entitled to under ordinary circumstances, the only mode of appeal cognizable by this Court is “a petition for review on certiorari.”[8] That is governed by and disposed of in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Constitution, laws, Rules 45; 48; Sections 1, 2, and 5 to 11 of Rules 51; 52; and 56.[9] Notably, Rule 47 on annulment of judgments has nothing to do with the provisions which govern petitions for review on certiorari. Thus, it is totally inappropriate to extend Rule 47 to the review of decisions of the Court of Appeals. Then too, appeals by certiorari to this Court must be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or the final order or resolution appealed from.[10] Even if we were to treat the petition for annulment of judgment as an appeal by certiorari, the same could not be given due course as it had been filed several months after the Court of Appeals decision had already lapsed to finality.
Admittedly,
this Court has discretionary power to take cognizance of a petition over which
it ordinarily has no jurisdiction “if compelling reasons, or the nature and
importance of the issues raised, warrant the immediate exercise of its
jurisdiction.”[11]
Hence, in
Our ruling in Alabanzas v. Intermediate Appellate Court[13] bears citation. Counsel for private respondent therein failed to file the appellant’s brief with the Court of Appeals. The lapse led to the dismissal of the appeal and the subsequent finality of the lower court judgment. Disallowing the annulment of judgment sought by private respondent on the ground of negligence of her lawyer, this Court held:
It is well-settled that once a decision
becomes final and executory, it is
removed from the power or jurisdiction of the Court which rendered it to
further amend, much less revoke it (Turquieza v. Hernando, 97 SCRA 483 [1980];
Heirs of Patriaca v. CA, 124 SCRA 410 [1983]; Javier v. Madamba, Jr., 174 SCRA
495 [1989]; Galindez v. Rural Bank of Llanera, Inc., 175 SCRA 132 [1989];
Olympia International, Inc. v. CA, 180 SCRA 353 [1989]). Decisions which have
long become final and executory cannot be annulled by courts (United CMC
Textile Workers Union v. Labor Arbiter, 149 SCRA 424 [1987]) and the appellate
court is deprived of jurisdiction to alter the trial court's final judgment
(Carbonel v. CA, 147 SCRA 656 [1987]; Republic v. Reyes, 155 SCRA 313 [1987]).
The doctrine of finality of judgment is
grounded on fundamental considerations of public and sound practice that at the
risk of occasional error, the judgments of the courts must become final at some
definite date set by law (Turquieza v. Hernando, supra; H[e]irs of Patriaca v. CA, supra; Edra v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 344 [1989]).
Reopening of a case which has become final and executory is disallowed
(Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Arciaga, 148 SCRA, [sic] 433 [1987]; Edra
v. Intermediate Court, supra.). The
subsequent filing of a motion for reconsideration cannot disturb the finality
of a judgment and restore jurisdiction which had already been lost (Pfleider v.
Victorino, 98 SCRA 491 [1980]; Heirs of Patriaca v. CA, supra).
After the judgment has become final, no
addition can be made thereto and nothing can be done therewith except its execution;
otherwise, there can be no end to litigation, thus setting at naught the main
role of Courts of Justice, which is to assist in the enforcement of the rule of
law and the maintenance of peace and order, by settling justiciable
controversies with finality (Farescal Vda. de Emnas v. Emnas, 95 SCRA 470
[1980]; Heirs of Patriaca v. CA, supra).
Moreover, it is an equally well-settled
rule that the client is bound by his counsel's conduct, negligence and mistake
in handling the case, and the client cannot be heard to complain that the
result might have been different had his lawyer proceeded differently (Vivero v.
It is only in case of gross or palpable
negligence of counsel when the courts must step in and accord relief to a
client who suffered thereby. (Legarda v. CA, 195 SCRA 418). In the present
case, the private respondents have not shown such carelessness or negligence in
their lawyer's discharge of his duties to them as to justify a deviation from
the rule that "clients should be bound by the acts of their counsel,
including his mistakes."[14]
Petitioners cite quite a few cases in
support of their claim that the purported negligence of their former counsel
sufficiently justifies the annulment of the judgment of the Court of Appeals. We
are not impressed. Only Apex Mining,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals[15]
involved a petition for annulment of judgment but the petition therein was regular
and in order, assailing as it did a decision of the Regional Trial Court before
the Court of Appeals. Unlike in Apex, the present petition is bereft of
mooring under procedural law. Hence, Apex is not a governing precedent in
this case.
It is also worthy of note that the
challenge to the decisions of the Court
of Appeals and the RTC ultimately involve questions of fact, even necessitating
an examination of the boundaries of the subject property. Both the RTC and the
Court of Appeals arrived at common findings on all decisive factual issues, and
the Court is not wont to engage in another factual review. The original
complaint was filed in 1984 and the judgment dismissing the complaint became final
and executory in 2001. There is a need to lay the matter to rest once and for
all. Entertaining the present petition, which bears no approbation under the
Rules of Court in the first place, defeats the ends of justice and the
principle of finality of judgment.
A last note. Since the filing of the
petition, a collateral issue has arisen between the counsel who originally filed
the petition in behalf of petitioners and the new counsel who subsequently entered
his appearance allegedly in behalf of all petitioners. The former counsel had
sought to record a contingent contract she had earlier forged with petitioners,
assuring her of around one-third (1/3) of the value of the “recovery by
petitioners in this case” as her contingent fee. This motion was opposed by the
new counsel. No action need be taken on the motion, it having been mooted by
this Decision. With the dismissal of the
petition and reaffirmance of the final
and executory judgment against petitioners, any inquiry into the contingent fee
agreement has become a purely theoretical exercise.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief
Justice
*Petitioner Estanislao Quibal, representing the heirs of Rosita Grande-Quibal, is also identified as Estanislao Quibial, representing the heirs of Rosita-Qubial, in the decisions of the Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
[1]Decision and Resolution penned by Associate Justice C. Ibay-Somera, concurred in by Associate Justices O. Agacaoli and M. Umali; rollo, pp. 20-106..
[6]See 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 47, Sec. 1.